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INTRODUCTION
“There is not a shadow of right in the general government to
intermeddle with religion.”—James Madison, Journal Excerpt,
1788.1

When President Clinton signed the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) into law on September 22,
2000, he gave religious prisoners a powerful tool for challenging
prison regulations that burden their religious freedom.2 In Cutter v.
Wilkinson, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
RLUIPA and consequently strengthened an already potent method
for the religious prisoner to bring claims against prisons—one that is
unavailable to non-religious inmates.3
To understand the potential effects of RLUIPA, imagine a prisoner
in jail for murder, who announces to his guards that he cannot
perform his work duties on Wednesdays because Wednesday is a holy
day in his religion, a form of Satanism.4 Until this point, he has never
mentioned or demonstrated that he follows any religion.5 This
prisoner also tells the guards that, because of his beliefs, he will need
martial arts classes and special food.6 If the prison officials deny his
1. AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, WHAT GOD HAS PUT
ASUNDER: JAMES MADISON QUOTES ON CHURCH AND STATE, available at http://
www.au.org/site/DocServer/Madison.pdf?docID=141 (last visited July 26, 2006).
2. See Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President (Sept. 22, 2000),
available at http://remnant-online.com/ubb/Forum24/HTML/000085.html (stating
that President Clinton supported RLUIPA because it would provide protection for
the religious rights of Americans).
3. See 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2121 (2005) (finding that RLUIPA is constitutional
because it is a valid accommodation of religion).
4. Cf. Gregory S. Walston, Federalism and Federal Spending: Why the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 is Unconstitutional, 23 U. HAW. L.
REV. 479, 480 (2001) (noting that in one claim that arose under RLUIPA a prisoner
sought to avoid his Monday work duties by declaring a religion with a Monday
Sabbath).
5. Cf. Kevin M. Powers, The Sword and the Shield: RLUIPA and the New Battle
Ground of Religious Freedom, 22 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 163 (2004) (indicating that
there is no requirement that a prisoner give authorities notice of his religion in order
to obtain protection under the First Amendment).
6. Cf. Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 2003) (upholding a RLUIPA
challenge to prison officials’ refusal to provide a plaintiff inmate with a special kosher
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request, a court will most likely hear this prisoner’s claim under
RLUIPA, even though the same court would probably dismiss his
claim if it was not religious in nature.7 Thus, with the passage of
RLUIPA, Congress enacted a law that favors inmates with religious
beliefs over those who are agnostic or atheist, thereby blurring the
traditional lines dividing Church and State.8
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s analysis of
RLUIPA’s constitutionality will result in excessive litigation and
unacceptable threats to important penological interests.9 Further, it
contends that there is room for the Court to reexamine its application
of Establishment Clause principles to RLUIPA to avoid these negative
implications.10 Part I provides an overview of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and discusses the current state of prisoners’
constitutional rights.11 Additionally, Part I evaluates RLUIPA’s
enactment, the Cutter decision, and its background.12 Part II.A
argues that in Cutter the Court articulated a new standard in local
prisons for adjudicating RLUIPA claims, which will lead to confusion
in the lower courts.13 Finally, Part II.C considers the Court’s
Establishment Clause analysis in Cutter and suggests alternate
perspectives that the Court could have considered.14

diet).
7. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2005) (explaining that RLUIPA applies to cases in which the
government imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise in a program or
activity that receives federal funding or is subject to the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution).
8. See Ada-Marie Walsh, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000: Unconstitutional and Unnecessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189, 189 (2001)
(noting that RLUIPA protects only those citizens who adhere to an organized
religious creed).
9. See infra Part II.B (discussing the way in which RLUIPA curtails prison
officials’ ability to guard against security threats and escape risks).
10. See infra Part II.C (explaining that a future Court could reexamine the
unconstitutional burden RLUIPA places on non-religious prisoners).
11. See infra Part I.B (discussing the rational basis standard courts apply to
prisoners’ religious rights and other fundamental rights).
12. See infra Part I.D (discussing the factual circumstances and procedural history
behind Cutter).
13. See infra Part II.A (explaining that, in Cutter, the Court placed restraints on
RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard).
14. See infra Part II.C (explaining that the Cutter Court’s analysis focused on the
Establishment Clause’s requirement that there be neutrality between particular
religions, instead of between religion and irreligion).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Establishment Clause Doctrine
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”15 The
Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of the Establishment
Clause is to separate the Church from the State.16 Thus, the
Establishment Clause attempts to protect against the government
expressing a preference between religions or privileging a religion
over non-religion.17 Neutrality is the fundamental requirement of the
Establishment Clause.18 However, in Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, the
Court stated that the government may accommodate religious
practices without violating the Establishment Clause.19
B. Prisoners’ Rights
Prisoners do not forfeit their constitutional protections upon
incarceration; however, lawful imprisonment deprives citizens of
many privileges and rights.20 Therefore, when the Supreme Court
crafted a test for reviewing prisoners’ constitutional claims, its goal
was to balance the need to protect prisoners’ constitutional rights and
the desire not to restrict prison administrators’ ability to perform their
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)
(explaining that the framers of the Constitution purposely worded the Establishment
Clause to prohibit laws “respecting religion” so that, although a law might not
establish a religion, it might be one “respecting” religion in the sense that it could
lead to establishment and consequently violate the First Amendment).
16. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (relying
on the words of founding father Thomas Jefferson, the Court stated that the purpose
of the “clause against establishment of religion by law” was to “erect a wall of
separation between church and state”).
17. See id. (interpreting the Establishment Clause).
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another . . . .
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. Id.
18. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (emphasizing that a
democratic government must be neutral in all religious matters).
19. See 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to
a statutory exemption for religious organizations from a Title VII prohibition on
religious discrimination).
20. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-97 (1987) (noting that subject to
some restrictions, prisoners retain the fundamental right to marry), and Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968) (explaining that prisoners retain their right
to equal protection of laws), with O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348
(1987) (explaining that the requirements of the prison system justify the need for
prison regulations that constrict prisoners’ constitutional rights, such as the right to
marry).
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jobs effectively.21 The resulting test is a rational basis standard, which
the Supreme Court applies in most cases regarding prison regulations
that burden prisoners’ constitutional rights.22 Under a rational basis
standard, courts will uphold a law if it is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose.23 The Court articulated the four-part
test in Turner v. Safley for analyzing the reasonableness of regulations
that burden prisoners’ fundamental rights: (1) whether there is a
“valid, rational connection” between a prison regulation and a
legitimate government interest; (2) whether there are alternative
means available to the prisoner to exercise that right; (3) the impact
of accommodating the religious right on prison resources, guards and
other inmates; and (4) whether there are alternatives to the
regulation in question.24 When applying this test, courts generally
give significant deference to prison administrators and are unlikely to
interfere with the internal administration of prisons because the
judiciary does not want to interfere with important penological
objectives.25 Further, courts do not want judicial interference to
undermine prison security or endanger prison officials.26 Courts
accept that prison administrators are experts in their field and tend to
know more about the supervision of their institutions than judicial
officers.27

21. See Safley, 482 U.S. at 85 (noting that when the Court developed a test for
adjudicating prisoners’ constitutional claims, it considered the difficulties of prison
administration, as well as the importance of individual freedom).
22. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 646
(2d ed., Aspen Publishers 2002) (1980) (explaining that the challenger bears the
burden of proof under rational basis review).
23. See Guerra v. Scruggs, 942 F.2d 270, 279 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
rational basis test is deferential to the government).
24. See 482 U.S. at 89-90 (noting that the Court chose to apply a rational basis
analysis instead of a strict scrutiny, which would hinder the ability of prison officials to
run prisons).
25. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (holding that courts should
defer to prison and state officials who must cope with the explosive environment of
penal institutions); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) (listing as valid
penal objectives the deterrence of crime, rehabilitation, and security).
26. See Sheley v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987) (Edmonson, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that courts should increase deference to prison administrators
in issues concerning prison security, even if a prison restriction interferes with
prisoners rights).
27. See Kendrick v. Bland, 659 F. Supp. 1188, 1195-96 (W.D. Ky. 1987)
(determining that trained prison administrators can resolve problems more
effectively than judges).
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C. Background of RLUIPA
1. The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
A complete understanding of RLUIPA necessitates a discussion of
RLUIPA’s predecessor, The Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
(“RFRA”), as RLUIPA re-enacts the same substantive constitutional
standard of RFRA.28 Both RFRA and RLUIPA apply a strict scrutiny
standard of review to claims regarding religious rights, which is a
higher standard than rational basis review.29 Under strict scrutiny,
courts only uphold a law that burdens religious rights if the
government can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a
compelling government interest.30
Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court’s 1990
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, in which the Court held that the Constitution does not require
the application of a strict scrutiny standard to laws of general
applicability that burden the free exercise of religion.31 RFRA
prohibited federal and state governments from substantially
burdening the free exercise of religion unless the government could
show that the burden furthered a compelling government interest
and was the least restrictive means of doing so.32
Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 pursuant to its enforcement
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.33 During the five years of
RFRA’s enactment, the Court frequently heard cases regarding prison
regulations.34 To invoke RFRA, a plaintiff had to show that a
28. See Murphy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 987 (8th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that Congress used the same strict scrutiny language from RFRA in the
RLUIPA section that applies to prisoners).
29. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01 (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy)
(2000) (stating that the purpose of RLUIPA was to re-enact the strict scrutiny
standard of RFRA and specifically apply it to institutionalized persons and land use
provisions).
30. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 387 (2004) (noting that in strict
scrutiny review, the State generally has the burden of proving that a regulation that
affects a fundamental right is necessarily related to a compelling interest).
31. See 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (upholding a state law of general applicability
criminalizing peyote use, which led to the denial of unemployment benefits to Native
Americans, who lost their jobs because of their peyote use).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2005) (opining that the compelling interest test is an
appropriate test for striking a balance between religious liberty and competing
government interests).
33. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (empowering Congress to “enforce” the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of life, liberty, and property through
“appropriate legislation”).
34. See, e.g., Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1995) (hearing a Rastifari
inmate’s challenge to prison grooming regulations under RFRA); Show v. Patterson,
955 F. Supp. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying defendant’s motion for summary
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government action placed a substantial burden on the plaintiff’s
sincere religious belief.35 If the plaintiff could show a substantial
burden, the government had to prove it had a compelling interest in
burdening the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.36
The Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional in City of
Boerne v. Flores on the grounds that Congress exceeded its
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The
Supreme Court adopted the traditional interpretation of the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and determined
that Congress’s power to enforce is solely “preventative” or
“remedial.”38 The Court concluded that RFRA not only remedied
constitutional violations, but also created constitutional rights in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.39
2. Enactment of RLUIPA
Congress’s response to City of Boerne was to enact RLUIPA, which
narrowed RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard to apply only to two areas:
land use regulation and persons in institutions, including prisons,
mental hospitals, and nursing homes.40 Congress based the need for
RLUIPA on three years of hearings, which concluded that inmates
were at the mercy of prison officials, who often imposed arbitrary
judgment because prison officials may have violated the First Amendment religious
rights of Muslim prison inmates by strip searching the prisoners); cf. Storm v. Town
of Woodstock, 944 F. Supp. 139, 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the local parking
laws did not substantially burden the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion under RFRA);
Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d. 1294, 1303 (1996) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that
the University subsidized insurance program that covered abortions violated the free
exercise of religion of students because the plan did not substantially burden their
religious practice, and it satisfies strict scrutiny).
35. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (explaining that a
substantial burden occurs when the government forces a person to choose between
following his religion and giving up benefits or abandoning his religion).
36. See James A. Hanson, Missouri’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A New
Approach to the Cause of Conscience, 69 MO. L. REV. 853, 856 n.19 (2004) (noting
that the strict scrutiny test applied to the government under RFRA and RLUIPA is the
“strictest standard available at law”).
37. See 521 U.S. 507, 524, 536 (1997) (finding RFRA unconstitutional pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment in a case involving the Catholic Archbishop of San
Antonio’s challenge, under RFRA, to the local zoning authority’s denial of a building
permit to enlarge a church).
38. See id. at 529 (noting that the majority did not reach the issue of whether
RFRA violated the Establishment Clause because the Court declared RFRA
unconstitutional regarding the Enforcement Clause).
39. See id. at 532, 536 (explaining that RFRA’s great flaw was that it attempted to
change constitutional protections substantially by prohibiting state conduct that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit).
40. See RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2005) (noting that RLUIPA’s
substantive language, which is identical to RFRA’s, prohibits the government from
placing a burden on religious exercise unless that burden furthers a “compelling”
government interest and is the “least restrictive” means of doing so).
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rules regarding the right to practice religion.41 Congress relied on
the Judiciary Committee reports on RFRA, which concluded that
RFRA did not unreasonably burden the federal prison system.42
Furthermore, RLUIPA creates a private right of action for people who
believe the government has burdened their free exercise of religion.43
D. Cutter v. Wilkinson
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, a practicing witch, a white supremacist
minister, and followers of Asatru, a polytheistic Viking religion, all
filed suit pursuant to RLUIPA.44 The plaintiffs claimed that the Ohio
Department of Corrections (“ODOC”) denied them their access to
religious literature, denied them their freedom to conform their
appearance to the requirements of their religions, and denied them a
prison chaplain trained in their religions.45
The ODOC admitted that it refused to grant some of the plaintiffs’
religious requests, yet argued that these denials were necessary
because the plaintiffs’ religious practices threatened prison security.46
The plaintiffs contended that their religious practices were in no way
violent and posed no threat to prison security.47
On November 7, 2003, a Sixth Circuit panel held that RLUIPA
violated the Establishment Clause because the Act favors religious
rights over other fundamental rights and that the statute’s primary
41. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement
of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (noting that Congress held three hearings before the
Senate Judiciary Committee and six before the House Subcommittee on the
Constitution on the need for this legislation and noting that prisoners are often
exposed to religious discrimination).
42. See id. (explaining that prisoners are in an extremely vulnerable position
because their religious rights are in the hands of a few officials).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (2005) (stating that any person may assert a
violation of RLUIPA in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the
government).
44. See 349 F.3d 257, 260 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005) (noting
that the Sixth Circuit consolidated three cases in Cutter for the purpose of deciding
the Ohio Department of Correction’s facial challenge to RLUIPA: Gerhardt v.
Lazaroff, Case No. C2-95-517; Hampton v. Wilkinson, Case No. C2-98-275; and Miller
v. Wilkinson, Case No. C2-97-382).
45. See Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832-33 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(explaining that the plaintiffs originally brought their claims under the rational basis
standard of Turner v. Safley), rev’d sub nom., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113
(2005). However, after the enactment of RLUIPA, the plaintiffs amended their
complaints to contend that the more restrictive standards in RLUIPA applied to
ODOC’s actions. Id.
46. See id. (noting that the defendants claimed, for example, that investigators
linked the practice of Asatru to a 1993 riot at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility,
as well as murders and escapes at other Ohio prisons).
47. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005) (identifying that for the
purposes of the case, the defendants conceded that these are bona fide religions and
the plaintiffs do hold the beliefs of their respective religions).
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purpose was not to accommodate religion, but to advance religion.48
The Sixth Circuit was the only circuit to hold that RLUIPA violates the
Establishment Clause.49 As the Sixth Circuit noted, the “juggernaut”
of circuit court opinions has come to the opposite conclusion
regarding RLUIPA’s constitutionality.50 The Fourth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits rejected Establishment Clause challenges to RLUIPA,
concluding that RLUIPA has a legitimate and secular legislative
purpose and that the statute does not create more rights for religious
inmates.51 As a result of this circuit split, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.52
On May 31, 2005, Justice Ginsberg issued a unanimous opinion for
the Supreme Court, reversing the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and
upholding the constitutionality of RLUIPA.53 The Court held that
RLUIPA’s institutionalized persons provision does not violate the
Establishment Clause because it merely alleviates “governmentcreated” burdens on prisoners’ religious practice and, therefore, is a
lawful accommodation of religion.54 Further, the Court emphasized
48. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 265, 2268-69, rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005) (explaining
that the Sixth Circuit based its decision that RLUIPA violates the Establishment
Clause on the Supreme Court’s test for adjudicating Establishment Clause challenges,
articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
(1971) (creating a three-prong test, which remains the prevailing method to
determine whether a statute complies with the Establishment Clause). Under the
Lemon test, a statute is permissible if (1) it has a secular legislative purpose, (2) its
primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it does not create
excessive entanglement between government and religion. Id.
49. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 264, rev’d, 125 S.Ct 2113 (2005) (holding that
RLUIPA advances religion in violation of the Establishment Clause); see also Anne Y.
Chiu, Comment, When Prisoners’ Souls Are Weary and Their Religious Exercise
Burdened, RLUIPA Provides Some Rest for Their Souls, 79 WASH. L. REV. 999, 1017
(2004) (noting that the Sixth Circuit departed from the other circuits in holding that
RLUIPA favors religious rights over non-religious rights).
50. See Cutter, 349 F.3d at 262, rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005) (noting that two
district court opinions stood against the rest of the circuit courts, and these are the
opinions on which the Cutter Court relied).
51. See Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 317-19 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
prison officials violated RLUIPA when they denied a Jewish prisoner kosher meals);
Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601, 611 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming a Muslim inmate’s
right to access prayer oil in prison); Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1069
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that, under RLUIPA, prison officials could not bar Muslim
inmates from attending Friday prayer sessions).
52. See Respondents’ Brief in Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2,
Cutter, 125 S.Ct. 308 (2004) (No. 03-9877) (noting that the parties to Cutter agreed
that the question of RLUIPA’s alleged violation of the Establishment Clause was ripe
for review).
53. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2116 (noting that Justice Thomas filed a concurring
opinion in order to discuss how the issue of federalism applies to RLUIPA).
54. See id. (remarking that an act which removes government burdens is more
likely to be an accommodation of religion than an endorsement of religion). The
Court chose not to decide Cutter pursuant to the Lemon v. Kurtzman analysis, on
which the Sixth Circuit relied for its decision. Id. at 2120.
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that RLUIPA is consistent with the Establishment Clause because it
does not differentiate between particular religions.55 Additionally,
the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit’s argument that RLUIPA
impermissibly advances religion by affording religion greater
protection than other constitutionally protected rights.56 Although
the Sixth Circuit argued that, under RLUIPA, religious claims receive
more protection than other constitutional claims because they receive
strict scrutiny review, the Court emphasized that the Constitution
does not require that all constitutional rights receive legislative
protections at the same time or in the same manner.57 Further,
benefits to religious exercise need not be paired with benefits to nonreligious constitutional rights.58 According to the Court, if this were
the case, “all manner of religious accommodations” would fail because
each act of Congress, which provided for religious accommodation,
would have to provide for a corresponding secular right.59
Justice Ginsberg also emphasized that RLUIPA does not place the
need to accommodate prisoners’ religious activities above the need to
maintain prison order and security.60 The Court determined that
prison security is a compelling state interest, and thus prison officials
deserve deference in maintaining penal safety.61 The Court based
this decision, in part, on precedent demonstrating that religious
accommodation must be balanced to ensure it does not trump other
significant interests.62 Further, the Court examined the legislative
55. See id. at 2123 (noting the Supreme Court had previously invalidated a
statute that created a separate school district solely for a particular sect of Jews).
56. See id. at 2123-24 (reaffirming the Court’s decision in Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, where it
held that a statute exempting religious organizations from Title VII’s prohibition
against discrimination was not unconstitutional, even though it singled out religious
groups for a benefit).
57. See id. at 2124 (citing Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2003))
(noting that there is no legal requirement that legislative protections for
constitutional rights “march in lockstep”).
58. See id. (emphasizing that providing prisoners with a chaplain does not also
require providing a political consultant or a publicist).
59. See id. (arguing that if the Court held RLUIPA unconstitutional, it could no
longer grant military personnel permission to wear religious attire while in uniform);
see also David L. Hudson Jr., A Lower Bar to Religion Behind Bars, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT
22 (2005) (quoting Anthony Picarello, President of the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty) (“If [the Cutter decision] had gone the other way, religion-only based
accommodations which-exist nationwide and at every level of government: federal,
state and local would have been struck down wholesale”).
60. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2122 (explaining that accommodation must be
balanced so that it does not thwart other important interests).
61. See id. at 2122-24 n.13 (noting that when determining a compelling
governmental interest “context matters”).
62. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709-11 (1985) (striking down
a law that weighed the religious interests of Sabbatarians over all other interests).
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history behind RLUIPA and found that Congress enacted RLUIPA
with the need to maintain penal order and security in mind.63 Thus,
the Court determined that if inmate requests for accommodations
become excessive or imposed too many burdens on prison officials,
then as-applied challenges would be appropriate.64 The Court’s
unanimous decision both reaffirmed the principle that legislative
accommodations of religion do not violate the Establishment Clause
and stressed the importance of prison security and safety.65
II. ANALYSIS
A. In the Aftermath of the Cutter Decision a New Standard of Review
Emerges for Adjudicating RLUIPA Claims: Deferential Strict Scrutiny
Although the Supreme Court upheld RLUIPA’s institutionalized
persons’ provision and its strict scrutiny standard of review, it did so
with the caveat that RLUIPA requires significant deference to the
judgment of prison officials.66
Justice Ginsberg repeatedly
emphasized that courts should interpret RLUIPA’s elevated standard
to incorporate deference to the prison system’s interest in
maintaining safety and order, often referring to RLUIPA’s legislative
history.67 As a result, Justice Ginsberg called for a standard of review
that is strict, yet deferential.68
This decision could be interpreted to mean that the Court is calling
for a new standard of review: one that falls somewhere between the
rational basis approach urged by the Sixth Circuit and the absolute
strict scrutiny that appears on the face of the statute.69 If this is the
63. See 139 CONG. REC. 26190, S14350, S14364 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (remarks
of Sen. Hatch) (predicting that courts would apply RLUIPA with due deference to
the expertise of prison officials to maintain good order and discipline).
64. But see Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124-25 (noting that the Court did not anticipate
abusive prisoner litigation or excessive burdens on prison officials).
65. See id. at 2121 (noting that the government need not ignore compelling
impositions state actions placed on religion).
66. See id. at 2124 n.13 (“It bears repetition . . . that prison security is a
compelling state interest, and that deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise
in this area.”).
67. See id. at 2122 (explaining that the Court does not interpret RLUIPA to
elevate accommodation of religion over prisons’ interest in security). The legislative
history anticipated that RLUIPA be applied with deference to prison administrators.
Id. at 2123 (citing 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint
statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy)); 139 CONG. REC. 26190 (1993) (remarks of
Senator Hatch).
68. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2123 (instructing that RLUIPA should be applied in a
balanced way with “particular sensitivity to security concerns”) (emphasis added).
69. See Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court’s New Ruling on the Religious Land
and Institutionalized Persons Act’s Prison Provisions: Deferring Key Constitutional
Questions, June 2, 2005, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20050602.html
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case, the Cutter decision was not a complete defeat for opponents of
RLUIPA.70 Under strict scrutiny, courts rarely, if ever, uphold
regulations imposed by prison officials on inmates’ religious
freedoms.71 Indeed, strict scrutiny has been described by the Court as
“strict in theory, fatal in fact.”72 Therefore, by requiring lower courts
to “appropriately” balance inmates’ religious freedoms with deference
to prisons’ security interests, the Court places a significant limitation
on RLUIPA’s substantive standard.73 However, by placing this
constraint on RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard, and thus creating a
new standard of review, the Cutter decision will ultimately lead to
indecision in the lower courts concerning the application of RLUIPA.
Consequently, both the penal and court systems will struggle with the
burden of an uncertain RLUIPA standard.
The seemingly contradictory standard announced in Cutter follows
earlier Supreme Court decisions that required deference to
administrators in the face of prisoners’ constitutional rights claims.74
Thus, one possible explanation for the Court’s decision to articulate
this confusing and diluted standard is to adhere, at least partially, to
the rationale of its earlier prisoners’ rights decisions.75 RLUIPA’s

(remarking that the standard of review expressed in Cutter resembles intermediate
scrutiny review).
70. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGIOUS AND PUB. LIFE, THE PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE
SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN CUTTER V. WILKINSON: THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF
THE LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT, 3 (June 2005) [hereinafter PEW
FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT] (noting that Justice Ginsberg’s “interpretive gloss on
RLUIPA” may make it harder for prisoners to assert some RLUIPA claims in the
future).
71. See generally Libby Huskey, Constitutional Law—Affirmative Action in
Higher Education—Strict in Theory, Intermediate in Fact? Grutter v. Bollinger, 4
WYO. L. REV. 439, 454 (2004) (explaining that Supreme Court Justices in affirmative
action cases referred to strict scrutiny as a very harsh test).
72. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (noting that the strict standard is appropriate for brutal and repugnant
types of racism).
73. See PEW FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 71, at 3 (noting that
although the Court unanimously upheld RLUIPA, it placed important qualifications
on the future application of the statute and that Justice Ginsberg “laconically
dismissed” the idea that RLUIPA would impose a burden on prison officials).
74. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-51 (1987) (recognizing
the need to defer to the experience of prison officials and articulating a rational basis
standard for prisoners’ free exercise claims); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85
(1987) (noting that in developing a test for inmates’ constitutional rights, the Court
must defer to the expertise of prison administrators).
75. See Safley, 482 U.S. at 85 (noting that only prison administrators have the
expertise to deal with the specialized and difficult problems that arise in prisons);
Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 126 (1977) (arguing that the
courts should give broad deference to prison officials because of the complicated
nature of prison administration); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)
(explaining that considerations of prison security are “peculiarly within the province”
of prison officials).
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strict scrutiny standard ignores the important penological interests
that were behind the Court’s development of the Turner rational
basis test and, therefore, places accommodation over the compelling
interests of security and discipline.76 Although RLUIPA’s supporters
contend that strict scrutiny is absolutely necessary to protect
prisoners’ religious rights, the Turner Court specifically rejected a
strict scrutiny approach to inmates’ fundamental rights because it
would subject the day-to-day decisions of prison officials to an
inflexible standard, placing a straightjacket on their ability to solve
security problems.77 The Turner Court believed that a strict scrutiny
standard for prisoners’ rights would “distort” the decision-making
process because courts, which are ill-equipped to deal with prison
security issues, would constantly second-guess prison administrators.78
This rationale seemingly justifies the Cutter Court’s new “strict but
deferential” standard for RLUIPA.
Justice Ginsberg repeatedly referred to the legislative history
behind RLUIPA and stressed that RLUIPA’s proponents recognized
the necessity of prison safety and discipline.79 According to the
Court, lawmakers supporting RLUIPA anticipated that courts would
interpret RLUIPA with due deference to prison officials’ expertise.80
However, the legislative record behind the enactment of RLUIPA is
troublesome.81 Both houses of Congress suspended the rules and no
public hearings occurred before RLUIPA’s extremely fast passage.82
Therefore, there was little debate about RLUIPA’s constitutionality
and no examination of the burdens it would place on prison
officials.83
76. See Safley, 482 U.S. at 84-85 (emphasizing the need for a standard that
balanced the need to protect prisoners’ rights and judicial restraint regarding inmate
claims). Further, the Court recognized that the problems in prisons are complex,
they require expertise, detailed planning, and are not easily remedied by judicial
interference. Id.
77. See id. at 89 (deciding that prison officials, rather than the courts, are to
make the difficult decisions regarding the operations of prisons).
78. See id. (noting that, under a strict scrutiny test, there is a possibility that a
court could reverse every administrative judgment).
79. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2123 (2005) (noting that the
lawmakers who enacted RLUIPA meant for prison administrators to establish the
regulations and procedures necessary to maintain order and security in prisons).
80. See id. (noting that the lawmakers who supported RLUIPA realized the
necessity for maintaining safety and discipline in prisons).
81. See American Atheists, Scaled-Down Religious Act is Done Deal-For Now,
Aug. 18, 2000, http://www.atheists.org/flash.line.rlpa38.html (commenting on the
“Machiavellian” way in which Congress re-enacted the RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard
in RLUIPA, after the Court deemed RFRA unconstitutional).
82. See id. (noting that the passage of RLUIPA stunned professional lobbying
groups who opposed RLUIPA’s enactment).
83. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism, 574 ANNALS
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This whirlwind passage of RLUIPA was most likely a result of
pressure from the myriad of powerful religious groups backing
RLUIPA.84 Congress did not discuss either the traditional deference
given to prison officials or the reasons the Court gave rational basis
review under Turner to prisoners’ rights during the enactment of
RLUIPA.85 Further, Congress was aware that prisoners already had a
remedy for infringement on religious rights: the Turner rational
relation test that the Supreme Court has deemed acceptable for other
fundamental rights.86 RLUIPA’s Congressional sponsors’ statement
that they expected federal courts to defer to the decisions of prison
officials regarding which restrictions on the exercise of religion are
necessary in the prison context seems insincere considering that the
enactment of RLUIPA replaced Turner in the arena of religious
challenges, which provided for deference to prison officials.87 This
inconsistency is another possible explanation for the Court’s decision
to modify RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard.
Justice Ginsberg’s analysis of RLUIPA and the Court’s “strict but
deferential” standard will likely lead to confusion in the lower courts
regarding how to apply the statute.88 On the one hand, the Court’s
decision to uphold RLUIPA offers support to the statute and
strengthens its provisions.89
On the other, Justice Ginsberg’s
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 93, 100 (2001) [hereinafter Hamilton, Federalism]
(noting that both the House and the Senate passed RLUIPA within a half an hour of
each other).
84. See Beyond the Pledge of Allegiance: Hostility to Religious Expression in the
Public Square: Hearing on S. H.R.G. 108-707 Before Subcomm. On the Constitution,
Civil Rights and Property Rights of the Comm. On the Judiciary United States Senate,
108th Cong. 143-161 (June 8, 2004) (statement of Melissa Rodgers, Professor, Wake
Forest Divinity School) (explaining that a vast coalition urged the passage of RLUIPA,
which included Muslims, Mormons, Methodists, and the National Association of
Evangelicals).
85 See Hamilton, Federalism supra note 84, at 341 (noting that when
accommodation of a right will have a “ripple effect” on fellow inmates, courts should
be particularly deferential to prison officials).
86. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (noting the need for judicial
restraint regarding the protection of prisoners’ free exercise claims).
87. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774-01, S7774 (joint statements of Sens. Hatch and
Kennedy) (noting that Congress should defer to the experience and expertise of
prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to
maintain good order, security, and discipline); cf. Lynn S. Branham, Go and Sin no
More: The Constitutionality of Governmentally Funded Faith-Based Prison Units, 37
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 297 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court crafted the
Turner test to make it difficult for prisoners’ constitutional rights claims to be
successful).
88. See PEW FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 71, at 3 (commenting that
Justice Ginsberg did not explain or even mention RLUIPA’s “least restrictive means”
requirement and that Justice Ginsberg maintained that courts must consider the
context of cases when deciding “compelling interests”).
89. See The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, RLUIPA Upheld Unanimously in
Cutter v. Wilkinson, May 31, 2005, http://www.rluipa.com/index.php/article/395.
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repeated call for deference may lead lower courts to question the
decision and consequently will foster more RLUIPA litigation.90 This
uncertainty could ultimately burden both the court and prison
systems, which will be forced to contend with the increase in RLUIPA
claims.91
B. The Implementation of RLUIPA Results in Excessive Requests for
Accommodation and Unacceptable Burdens on Important
Penological Interests
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter will most likely result in an
increase in litigation and thereby burden penological interests.
Litigation will most likely increase whether the legal system is clogged
by RLUIPA claims or whether prisoners interpret Cutter to strengthen
RLUIPA. Increased RLUIPA claims will burden prison officials who
must concern themselves with potential litigation, rather than
conducting the ordinary business of running their prisons.92 In
determining RLUIPA’s constitutionality, the Cutter Court scrutinized
the statute generally and failed to address specific applications of the
statute.93 This section examines the potential impact of RLUIPA, the
Court’s decision in specific cases, and the affect RLUIPA has already
had on individual prison officials, local governments, and state
departments of corrections.
In Cutter, Justice Ginsberg presumed that RLUIPA will not
undermine the state’s interest in security and implied that prisoners’
claims under RLUIPA will not be overwhelmingly successful.94
However, an examination of RLUIPA suggests that the opposite is
true. First, the statute’s language allows for frivolous claims, which
html (proclaiming that Cutter is a “thumping victory” for religious exercise).
90. See Charles C. Haynes, Inside the First Amendment: With Little Fanfare,
Religion Wins Big at the Supreme Court, June 12, 2005, available at http://
www.nna.org/GR/FirstAmendEd06-12-05.htm (noting that the Court’s decision in
Cutter will not end the debate regarding RLUIPA’s constitutionality).
91. See Ruth Burdick, Note, The Casey Undue Burden Standard: Problems
Predicted and Encountered, and the Split over the Salerno Test, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 825, 826 (1996) (discussing the increase in litigation that a lack of guidance and
method for using a new standard causes).
92. See Marci Hamilton, Two Important Establishment Clause Issues the
Supreme Court Will Decide This Term (Oct. 21, 2004), http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/hamilton/20041021.html [hereinafter Hamilton, Important Issues] (stating that
under RLUIPA, every prison regulation is presumptively unconstitutional, resulting in
difficulty in maintaining order).
93. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2124 (2005) (emphasizing that the
Court is responding to a facial challenge to RLUIPA and therefore the Court did not
examine the constitutionality of the results of RLUIPA’s application in specific
circumstances).
94. See id. at 2123 (opining that the Court has no reason to believe that courts
will not apply RLUIPA appropriately and with special attention to security needs).
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place unreasonable strains on the prison and court system.95 Second,
an assessment of actual RLUIPA actions reveals that the majority of
prisoners’ claims are successful, even when important penological
interests are at stake.96
1. RLUIPA’s “Religious Exercise” Requirement Allows for Excessive
Litigation, Which Burdens Both the Prisons and Courts
Congress drafted RLUIPA in a way that allows for an excessive
number of prisoners’ claims.97 In order to invoke RLUIPA, the first
threshold a prisoner must reach is to show that a government action
“substantially” burdens his “religious exercise.”98 However, under
RLUIPA this is an extremely low bar.99 The requirements of religious
exercise are minimal and Congress designed them to allow for as
many claimants as possible.100 RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to
include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or
central to a system of religious belief.”101 This broad standard does
not limit the types of religious activities that qualify as “exercise”
under RLUIPA; thus, any spiritual act is eligible for protection.102
95. See Stephen A. Haller, On Sacred Ground: Exploring Congress’s Attempts to
Rein in Discriminatory State Zoning Practices, 33 SW. U.L. REV. 285, 304-05 (2004)
(noting that in the case of RLUIPA’s land use provision, RLUIPA’s broad definition
of religious exercise could be used by a religious group to erect a health club or a
drive-in restaurant).
96. See Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 515
(2005) (noting that only seven of the forty-six prisoner RLUIPA claims from 2000 to
2004 were dismissed for failing to demonstrate a substantial burden).
97. See Caroline Adams, The Constitutional Validity of the Religious Land and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Will RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Survive the
Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2361, 2402 (2002) (contending
that RLUIPA defines religious exercise more broadly than even the Supreme Court’s
interpretation allows).
98. See Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 567 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
plaintiff first must prove that the burdened exercise is religious and then that the
burden is substantial); see also Gaubatz, supra note 97, at 515 (explaining that the
Supreme Court defines substantial burden as a situation in which a government
restriction placed on a privilege tends to inhibit religious exercise). An example of a
substantial burden is when a person must choose between following his religion and
forfeiting benefits, on one hand, and abandoning his religion on the other hand. Id.
99. See Powers, supra note 5, at 143 (noting that beliefs need not be coherent or
systemic for the First Amendment to protect them).
100. See Hamilton, Important Issues, supra note 93, at 1 (stating that under
RLUIPA, every prison regulation is presumptively unconstitutional, resulting in
difficulty in maintaining order).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163,
185 (1965) (articulating that the truth of a belief is not questionable).
102. See, e.g., Pounders v. Kempker, 79 F. App’x 941, 943 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding
that prison’s failure to provide a sweat lodge to Native American prisoners stated a
claim under RLUIPA); Goodman v. Snyder, No. 00-C-0948, 2003 WL 715650, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2003) (determining that the use of tarot cards constituted a
protected spiritual act under RLUIPA).
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Further, the Supreme Court defines religious belief to include all
beliefs that are sincere and “within the claimants own scheme of
things, religious.”103
In addition to its broad definition of religious exercise, RLUIPA
precludes inquiry into whether a specific belief or practice is “central
to a prisoner’s religion.”104 This means that if a prisoner brings a
RLUIPA action claiming that a prison regulation burdens his religious
exercise, the act the regulation burdens does not have to be a key
element to his religious practice.105 Considering the complex
security issues at stake in the prison system, it is possible that
important prison regulations will be overruled for activities that are
not at the crux of a prisoner’s religious practice.106 For example, in
Goodman v. Snyder, an Illinois prisoner brought a RLUIPA claim
because prison officials refused to provide him with the lacto-ovo
vegetarian diet required by his Wiccan religion and also because the
officials denied his request for tarot cards.107 The United States
District Court for the East District of Illinois held that the prison’s
refusal to provide the inmate with tarot cards violated the inmate’s
rights under RLUIPA, even though the he never claimed the tarot
cards were central to his religious practice.108
In Cutter, the Supreme Court acknowledged RLUIPA’s minimal
belief requirement and conceded that a court must follow an
individual prisoner’s subjective opinion that a specific practice or
request is a religious belief.109 Thus, under RLUIPA, one could label
103. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185 (noting that a person cannot be forced to prove
his religious convictions because what may be religious fact to one man may be
unbelievable to another).
104. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2124 n.13 (2005) (explaining that
when a court examines the religiosity of inmates under RLUIPA, the issue is whether
the inmates’ beliefs are truly held); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (holding that it is not the judiciary’s
job to question the validity of particular beliefs or the validity of a litigant’s
interpretation of religion).
105. See generally Goodman, 2003 WL 715650, at * 5 (denying a prison’s summary
judgment motion regarding a Wiccan prisoner’s request for Tarot cards that he
desired in connection with his religion, but that were not required for the practice of
his religion).
106. See Marria v. Broaddus, No. 97 Civ. 8297, 2003 WL 21782633, at *15 (S.D.N.Y.
July 31, 2003) (forbidding the New York prison system’s ban on the Five Percenters’
religious literature, even though the prison administrators presented evidence that
the Five Percenters engaged in gang activity).
107. See Goodman, 2003 WL 715650, at *1 (noting that the prison officials argued
that the use of tarot cards is often prohibited in prisons because they contained
symbols, such as the devil and pitchfork, used by gangs).
108. See id. at *5 (noting that the court dismissed the defendant prison officials
summary judgment motion).
109. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2124 n.13 (2005) (noting that the “truth of a
[religious] belief is not open to question”).
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virtually any practice in prison as “religious.”110 In the prison setting,
RLUIPA’s minimal requirement for “religious exercise” means that
not only may a prisoner claim to need special treatment, food, or
access based on his religion, but also that society does not have to
recognize his religion in any organized or accepted way.111 To bring
a claim under RLUIPA, all a prisoner must do is profess that he
believes in something, anything, and he will receive RLUIPA’s strict
scrutiny standard, while prison administrators must bear the burden
of demonstrating why the challenged prison regulation was
compelling.112 Further, under RLUIPA, prison officials need not
have any previous knowledge that a prisoner held alleged beliefs or
necessitated certain “accommodations” before the administrator
unknowingly may violate the prisoner’s exercise of these beliefs.113
There is no limit to the type or number of religious beliefs that
prisoners can claim under RLUIPA; thus, there are few limits to the
number of cases prisoners may bring under the statute.114 When
prisoners realize that they may claim to be followers of any religion,
regardless of its practices or creed, and that they can demand special
rights under RLUIPA, contrived religions may become commonplace
in prisons because of the benefits religious prisoners receive.115
Consequently, by upholding RLUIPA’s constitutionality, the Supreme
Court has created a powerful weapon for religious groups.116 Under
RLUIPA, the number of prisoners claiming religious burdens and
unorthodox beliefs most likely will increase, just as it did under

110. See Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447, 1454 (E.D. Cal 1996) (noting that in
questions of religious practices, it does not matter what others regard as a religion, it
matters what the litigant thinks).
111. See Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 516 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(explaining that it is “fairly settled” that there is no requirement that a religion need
meet any doctrinal test before it receives First Amendment protection).
112. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc. of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d
1140, 1154 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (noting that if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
that a prison regulation violates RLUIPA, the burden of proof shifts to the
department of corrections).
113. See Powers, supra note 5, at 143 (explaining that if pre-registration cannot be
a qualification for free assembly, neither can it be for the right to the free exercise of
religion).
114. See Daniel R. Mandelker, An Introduction to Religious Land Use Issues,
SHO18 A.L.I –A.B.A. LAW INSTITUTE – AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 63, 79 (2002)
(noting that RLUIPA has caused a “flurry” of threatened and actual litigation).
115. Cf. Walston, supra note 4, at 480 (noting that claims under RLUIPA include
Satan worshippers and an inmate who made up his own religion with a Monday
Sabbath so that prison officials would exempt him from Monday job duties).
116. See Kris Banvard, Exercise in Frustration? A New Attempt by Congress to
Restore Strict Scrutiny to Governmental Burdens on Religious Practices, 31 CAP. U. L.
REV. 279, 312 (2003) (noting that RLUIPA is a weapon for religious groups because it
threatens a long and expensive lawsuit).
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RFRA.117 As a result of the large number of claims, RLUIPA is
particularly harmful to local governments because violations of
RLUIPA will subject local governments to excessive lawsuits.118
2. A Study of RLUIPA Cases Since the Statute’s Enactment
Demonstrates the Judiciary’s Tendency to Ignore Significant Security
Interests, When Faced with Prisoners’ Religious Claims
An examination of RLUIPA cases since its enactment in 2000
demonstrates the way in which the lower courts often push aside
security concerns in light of prisoners’ religious claims.119 Therefore,
the Cutter decision to uphold RLUIPA is likely to lead to the
misapplication of RLUIPA and exacerbate the problems prisoners
face. The most common cases involving RLUIPA claims challenge
prison regulations that forbid inmates from growing their hair past a
certain length or wearing head coverings, meeting in groups to
worship, and distributing specific types of banned literature.120
However, these regulations are targeted towards specific security
goals, which are based on the experience of prison administrators.121
Prison regulations forbidding long hair and beards are based on
prison officials’ beliefs that these regulations prevent inmates from
hiding contraband in their hair and beards, changing their
appearance to facilitate escape, and acknowledging gang affiliations
through their appearances.122 Opponents of RLUIPA point to
evidence that prison gangs often claim to be religious to further gang
activities.123 However, the majority of courts have held that prisons
117. Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827, 834 (S.D. Ohio 2002), rev’d sub
nom., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (2005)
(noting that, under RFRA, the number of religions Ohio prisoners claimed
expanded, the religions in question were often extremely unorthodox, and prisoners
demanded strange services, such as martial arts classes).
118. See Autumn L. Rierson, RLUIPA: Three Years Later, SJ053 A.L.I.A.B.AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 863, 865 (Apr. 2004)
(noting that religious institutions are using RLUIPA to “strong arm” local
communities and that local governments may also be subject to attorney’s fees and
possible damages).
119. See Gaubatz, supra note 97, at 570 (noting that courts are “skeptical” of
prison administrators arguments that prison policies that ban certain religious
literature or items are the least restrictive means of advancing a government interest).
120. See id. at 558 (noting that in these types of cases, prisoners’ claims have had
much more success than claims under RFRA or the Turner rational basis standard).
121. See Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1552-54 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that
the safety and security concerns in a hair length restriction challenge were based on
the prison officials’ experience in the prison system and were valid concerns).
122. See, e.g., Hoevenaar v. Lozaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2005).
123. See Comment, In the Belly of the Whale: Religious Practice in Prison, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1891, 1903 (2002) (noting that in recent years, the concern over hate
groups masquerading as religious groups has focused on pagan religions, such as
Asatru).
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may not categorically prohibit religious exemptions from grooming
policies and that these regulations constitute a substantial burden on
religious exercise.124
For example, in Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, the plaintiff claimed that an
Ohio prison regulation, which stipulated that all inmates’ hair be no
more than three inches long violated RLUIPA.125 The plaintiff was a
Native American who began practicing a native religion while
incarcerated in a facility that prohibited him from cutting his hair.126
The prison officials argued that the purpose of the general prison ban
on long hair was to prevent the concealment of contraband or inmate
escape.127 Specifically, the officials believed the plaintiff to be a
particular security threat, as he had a “long history” of hiding
contraband and had twice attempted to escape from prison.128
However, the district court granted the plaintiff relief pursuant to
RLUIPA.129
Prison officials are also hesitant to allow religious inmates to gather
in groups or have access to certain types of literature because they fear
disrupters could utilize these methods to spread extremist views,
ethnic hatred, or recruit members to gangs or other violent
organizations.130 Yet courts applying RLUIPA have rejected prison
officials’ general arguments that focus on the need to eliminate access
124. See Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining
that a regulation requiring a Native American man to keep his hair no longer than
three inches was not the least restrictive means to further government interest);
Collins-Bey v. Thomas, No. 03 C 2779, 2004 WL 2381874, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25,
2004) (finding that a prison regulation that required the plaintiff to cut his hair in
violation of his religious beliefs substantially burdened his religious exercise);
Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that a
prison was unjustified in preventing Muslim prisoners from wearing beards).
125. See 422 F.3d at 367 (explaining that the prison regulation also banned any
hairstyles that were determined by officials to be a threat to any penological interest).
126. See id. (noting that the inmate first commenced an administrative proceeding
challenging the long hair ban, which was unsuccessful).
127. See id. (explaining that prison officials contended that, when assessing the
security risk, it was not relevant that the plaintiff was a medium security prisoner
because prisoners escape and contraband problems also occur in medium security
prisons).
128. See id. at *5 (explaining that the safety concerns the prison officials expressed
were based on their collective experience administering penal institutions).
129. See Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 276 F. Supp. 2d 811, 828 (S.D. Ohio 2003), rev’d,
No. 03-4119, 2005 WL 2154948, at *1 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that the Sixth Circuit
reversed the district court’s decision after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Cutter
because the district court failed to give appropriate deference to prison officials).
130. See, e.g, Marria v. Broadus, 200 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284 (S.D. N.Y. 2002)
(explaining that prison officials do not allow violent groups to assemble or receive
group literature because to do so would legitimize the status of the group and
interfere with security); see also Anti-Defamation League, Prison Extremism and the
First Amendment, http://www.adl.org/civil_rights/prison_ex.asp (last visited July 26,
2006) (noting that the Aryan Nation publishes a prison outreach newsletter to recruit
inmates and spread ideas).
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to literature and other inmates on the grounds of safety and
security.131 For example, in Marria v. Broaddus, a New York district
court rejected prison officials’ evidence that the plaintiff prisoners
posed a threat to prison security and thus, limitations on their access
to literature and assembly were justified.132 The plaintiff in Marria
was a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths or the Five
Percenters, which shares many beliefs of the Nation of Islam,
including the belief that the white man is the devil.133 The New York
Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”) maintained a policy
that forbade the plaintiff from receiving his religion’s newspaper or
from assembling with other members of his group.134 Although
prison officials believed the Five Percenters to be involved in gang
activity, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, denying the DOCS’s
motion to dismiss.135
Decisions finding that prisoners’ state RLUIPA claims or dismissing
prison officials’ summary judgment motions in the face of important
security interests are disturbing, particularly because the Court has
held that prisoners lose some of their rights when they are

131. See, e.g., Coronel v. Paul, 316 F. Supp. 2d 868, 881 (D. Ariz. 2004)
(determining that a prison policy which forbid a Dianic pagan prisoner to attend
other pagan worship services was a substantial burden on the free exercise of
religion); Borzch v. Frank, 340 F. Supp. 2d 955, 968 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (finding that a
prison’s policy of forbidding plaintiff’s Odinist literature constituted a substantial
burden under RLUIPA); Holiday v. Giusto, No. CV 03-01385-AS, 2004 WL 1792466,
at *7-8 (D. Or. Aug. 10, 2004) (denying prison’s motion for summary judgment
relating to Muslim prisoners’ claim that they were denied the opportunity for group
prayer); Goodman v. Snyder, No. 00-C-0948, 2003 WL 715650 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27,
2003) (finding that prisoners’ rights were substantially burdened by a ban on Asatru
religious runes); Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and
Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 526
(2005) (discussing the holding in Limbaugh v. Thompson, where Native American
prisoners’ rights were substantially burdened by the prison’s refusal to allow a sweat
lodge).
132. See 200 F. Supp. 2d at 284 (noting that the New York State Department of
Corrections submitted affidavits from its personnel and inmates from all New York
prison facilities, which characterized the Five Percenters as a gang).
133. But see id. at 284 n.3 (remarking that, according to the plaintiff, there are
many differences between the Five Percenters and the Nation of Islam). Additionally,
according to the plaintiff, the Nation of Gods and Earths is not a gang. Id. at 284.
134. See id. at 282 (noting that the plaintiff became a member of the Five
Percenters while incarcerated).
135. See id. at 298 (explaining that the court denied summary judgment to the
DOCS because a question exists as to whether the ban on the Five Percenters’
literature is reasonably related to the DOCS’s security interests); see also Lindell v.
McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that denying an inmate
follower of Wotanism access to Wotanist literature and the ability to congregate with
other Wotanists was a substantial burden on his free exercise). Wotanism pronounces
the “Nordic Race” the chosen race and the plaintiff is an “avowed White
Supremacist.” Id. at 1108. However, the court rejected prison officials’ argument
that they would not acknowledge or endorse racist groups that disrupt prison life. Id.
at 1110.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006

21

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 5

606

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 14:3

incarcerated.136 However, whereas the courts restrict a typical
prisoner’s rights upon incarceration, RLUIPA abolishes these
restrictions and allows prisoners to engage in practices that are
consistent with their religious beliefs, regardless of whether a prison
system has eliminated a practice because of safety concerns.137 The
many religious converts that arise in prisons under RLUIPA divert
prison staff from important security issues and disrupt daily life in the
prisons.138
C. A Future Supreme Court Decision to Revisit the Cutter Court’s
Establishment Clause Analysis Could Avoid the Negative Impacts of
RLUIPA
In its Establishment Clause analysis, the Cutter Court determined
that RLUIPA is a valid accommodation of religion because it does not
prefer one religion over another religion.139 The Court emphasized
this point repeatedly, noting that RLUIPA “will be administered
neutrally among different faiths.”140 However, while the Court based
its determination that RLUIPA is consistent with the Establishment
Clause on the conclusion that RLUIPA applies equally to different
religious sects, it did not fully address whether RLUIPA prefers
religion over irreligion.141 In fact, Justice Ginsberg’s sole analysis of
the latter issue was in a footnote.142
This section contends that RLUIPA resulted in the preferential
treatment of religious prisoners and has the effect of persuading nonreligious prisoners that they will receive better treatment in prison by
feigning religious belief.143 Thus, a future Court could reach the
136. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1977)
(holding that an inmate retains only those rights that are consistent with the
important penological objectives of the prison system).
137. See generally Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that
these practices include wearing religious headgear and icons, having ungroomed hair
and beards, receiving extremist literature, and refusing to submit to medical tests).
138. See Respondents’ Brief in Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 53, at 19 (arguing that an additional effect of the large number of religious
requests under RLUIPA is that the small number of prison chaplains must spend
their time dealing with the requests instead of organizing religious programs).
139. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2114, 2123 (2005) (noting that RLUIPA
does not give any religious group privileged status).
140. See id. at 2115 (explaining that RLUIPA does not “differentiate among bona
fide faith[s]”).
141. See PEW FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 71, at 2 (noting that the
court emphasized that RLUIPA was necessary because majority faiths are often
favored and minority religions disadvantaged).
142. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2122 n.10 (providing a response to the Respondent’s
notion that one effect of RLUIPA is that it encourages non-religious prisoners to “get
religion,” thereby advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause).
143. See Marci Hamilton, California’s Defeat of a State RLUIPA Bill: The Growing
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conclusion that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause, by
approaching the Establishment Clause analysis of RLUIPA from a
different perspective.144
RLUIPA favors and protects those prisoners who follow an
organized belief of religion over those without a system of religious
belief.145 As a result of RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard, prisoners
who claim to have a religious faith are exempt from many of the
hardships that are part of prison life.146 RLUIPA provides benefits
solely on a religious basis because it is only applicable to religious
prisoners, and thus, atheist and agnostic prisoners cannot utilize
RLUIPA.147
The enormous and disproportionate amount of
protection RLUIPA gives to religious prisoners is evident in the many
exemptions and privileges courts require prison officials to provide
only to religious prisoners under RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard.148
Thus, RLUIPA’s effect is to advance religion to the disadvantage of
non-religious prisoners.149
Proponents of RLUIPA argue that the Court previously has upheld
statutes exempting religious organizations and persons from certain
burdens; thus, RLUIPA does not advance religion.150 However,
RLUIPA is distinguishable from these rulings because in the cases in
which the Court upheld religious exemptions, a number of secular
Backlash Against Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Acts, Jan. 24, 2004,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20040129.html (last visited July 26, 2006)
(stating that the effect of RLUIPA is to treat the non-religious and the religious
unequally under the law).
144. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (explaining that a statute
violates the Establishment Clause if it has the effect of advancing religion). To
determine if a statute advances religion, the Court considers whether the act will
induce religious exercise, rather than only protect it. Id.; see also Texas Monthly v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (noting that the State may not compel non-religious
people to be religious).
145. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 189 (noting that eighteenth century essayist
Samuel Johnson’s maxim, “[t]o be of no church is dangerous,” is more true in the
time of RLUIPA than ever before).
146. See, e.g., Figel v. Overton, 121 F. App’x 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that
a prisoner who alleged that the confiscation of prohibited publications violated his
First Amendment right to free religion stated a claim under RLUIPA).
147. See 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1 (reiterating that RLUIPA prohibits the state from
imposing a burden on religious exercise).
148. See, e.g., People v. Peterson, No. 7687/01, slip op. at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5,
2002) (upholding a Rastafari prisoner’s challenge under RLUIPA to restrictions on
hair lengths in prisons).
149. See Walsh, supra note 8, at 201 (explaining that RLUIPA advances religion to
the detriment of non-religious groups because only religious individuals can use
RLUIPA, and therefore non-believers are at a disadvantage).
150. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 (1983) (upholding tax
deductions for religious education); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75
(1970) (upholding a statute that exempted religious organizations from property
taxes).
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groups also received the benefit conferred, whereas RLUIPA applies
only to religious organizations.151 The unequal treatment of religious
and non-religious prisoners resulting from RLUIPA counters the
Establishment Clause’s fundamental principal of neutrality.152
By enacting RLUIPA, Congress gave the religious community a
broad right to claim strict scrutiny review, which atheists and agnostics
do not have.153 The various exceptions RLUIPA provides send the
message to non-religious inmates that they are outsiders to a
privileged community.154
An additional effect of RLUIPA is that its potential benefits induce
prisoners to feign a religious belief in order to receive the same
benefits as religious inmates.155 The Supreme Court has held that the
government may not compel non-religious members of society to
become religious.156 However, under RLUIPA, this is exactly what
happens.157 As Congress noted when it enacted RLUIPA, the prison
environment is one of limited freedoms, with little access to the
outside world and where prison administrators regulate all actions.158
Because of the restrictive nature of prison communities, prisoners
treasure all exceptions to rules; thus, any exceptions can lead to
jealousy among inmates.159
151. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 707 (indicating that the property tax exemption statute
applied generally to all non-profits that engaged in moral or mental improvement of
others, including hospitals, libraries, and cemeteries).
152. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654 n.3 (2002) (indicating that
neutrality is the “touchstone” of the Establishment Clause).
153. Cf. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 453-54 (1994)
(noting that compared to religious groups, secular groups receive no preferential
legal treatment).
154. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(condemning direct government endorsement of religion because it sends a message
to non-religious citizens that they are not members of the political community, and a
message to adherents that they are favored members of society).
155. See Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the
Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 292 n.357 (1989) (observing that if it were as
burdensome to claim religious exemption as any other exemption, motives for
fraudulent claims would decrease).
156. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (noting that the
government “may not compel affirmation of religious belief”).
157. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (stating that the government
cannot coerce anyone to participate in religion without violating the Establishment
Clause).
158. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sens. Hatch and Kennedy) (testifying that RLUIPA can offer a remedy to
institutionalized persons because prison official often burden inmates’ rights with
unfair and arbitrary rules and restrict their liberty for reasons of indifference,
ignorance, racism or monetary restraints).
159. See Dehart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 52 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that inmates can
become jealous of other inmates’ special religious diets); Garrett v. Gilmore, 926 F.
Supp. 554, 557 (W.D. Va. 1996) (explaining that exceptions to prison rules cause
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Under RLUIPA, religious inmates often receive preferential
treatment and a privileged status. Non-religious inmates, however,
remain limited in their exercise of fundamental rights, must eat a
prison diet, and allow guards to cut their hair and censor their
mail.160 If a non-religious inmate is fed up with unequal treatment
and wishes to have the same benefits as the religious inmates, his first
option is to challenge the regulation under the Turner rational
relation test, which is deferential to prison officials and is less likely to
result in victory for the inmate.161 His second option is to claim that
he shares the same religious beliefs as the inmates who receive the
preferential treatment he envies and RLUIPA will protect him.162
Considering the isolated and restrictive environment prisoners are in,
many prisoners will opt for the latter option and feign religious
conversion.163
Justice Ginsberg’s fleeting analysis of whether RLUIPA privileges
religion over nonreligion resides solely in a footnote.164 In response
to the Respondent’s argument that RLUIPA bestows advantages on
religious prisoners causing burdened, non-religious prisoners to
“feign piety” to receive the same treatment, the Court advances several
justifications.165 First, the Court argues that the accommodations
non-religious prisoners may gain by simulating religious conversion
are not truly “benefits.”166 The Court’s argument to support this
assertion is hardly persuasive.
The Court admits that some
accommodations of religion, unavailable to non-religious prisoners,
are obviously benefits, such as the “opportunity to assemble. . .
[,which] might attract joiners seeking a break in their closely guarded
day.”167
However, the Court counters the example of
resentment among inmates).
160. See 60 AM. JUR. 2D. Penal and Correctional Institutions § 23 (2004) (noting
that incarceration results in the removal or limitation of many privileges and rights
normally afforded to citizens).
161. See Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th Cir. 2002) (describing the
rational relation test under Turner as very deferential to prison officials).
162. See Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1442-1444 (W.D. Wis. 1995)
(evaluating a challenge under RFRA and worrying that prisoners might use religion
as a pretext for secular desires).
163. See Shawn P. Bailey, The Establishment Clause and the Religious Land and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 16 REGENT U.L. REV. 53, 76 (2003) (admitting
that RLUIPA could encourage religion if courts allow inmates to abuse RLUIPA).
164. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 125 S.Ct. 2113,
2122 n.10 (2005) (responding to Respondent’s argument that RLUIPA goes beyond
the permissible reduction of the free exercise of religion).
165. See id. (noting that Respondents argue that RLUIPA advances religion by
encouraging inmates to become religious).
166. See id. (emphasizing “doubt” that all accommodations are considered
“benefits” by inmates).
167. See id. (noting that Respondent’s Brief argued that one effect of RLUIPA is
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accommodation by noting that one state served a monotonous meal
as its kosher diet.168 It is hard to imagine that an unpleasant meal
could compensate for the exclusion from the constitutional right to
assemble. Further, the example of one specific instance of a religious
accommodation that is moderately unpleasant does not lead to the
conclusion that other religious accommodations are not benefits.169
The Court’s description of an unappetizing kosher meal does not
negate the fact that under RLUIPA, religious prisoners receive access
to literature, the right to assemble, and freedom from regulations
prohibiting long hair and literature that non-religious prisoners do
not.170
Second, the Court notes that prisons already give special treatment
to certain mainstream religious groups.171 The Court contends that
because the prison system currently provides chaplains, places to
assemble, and other services for conventional religions,
accommodation under RLUIPA does not violate the Establishment
Clause.172 However, this rationale does not address the issue at hand.
By making the argument that all religious prisoners, including those
who adhere to non-traditional religions, must be allowed
accommodation under RLUIPA because those who adhere to
traditional religions already are, the Court again focuses on RLUIPA’s
treatment of particular religions, instead of the burden on nonreligious prisoners.173 However, it does not matter which particular
religious groups have access to literature or a place to assemble. The
point is that all prisoners who are atheist cannot gain the right to
assemble pursuant to RLUIPA.174
to induce inmates to pretend to be religious in order to receive the statute’s benefits).
168. See id. (noting that congressional hearings on RLUIPA revealed that one
prison’s kosher diet contained a fruit, a vegetable, a granola bar, and a nutritional
supplement).
169. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (noting that the
exercise of religion often involves the consummation of wine and specific foods).
170. Compare Williams v. Snyder, 150 F. App’x 549, 554 (7th Cir. 2005)
(determining that a Rastafarian inmate who alleged prison officials requested he
remove his dreadlocks stated a claim under RLUIPA), with Williams, 2005 WL
2346964, at *3 (holding that a Rastafarian prisoner’s challenge to a prison hair length
policy failed to state valid claims under equal protection, access to courts, due
process, or the Eighth Amendment).
171. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2122 n.10 (noting that, in the case of mainstream
religious faiths, inmates may attend religious congregations and have access to Bibles
and other religious materials).
172. Cf. Louise M. Holscher, Sweat Lodges and Headbands: An Introduction to
the Rights of Native American Prisoners, 18 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
33, 37 (1992) (noting that prisons usually accommodate mainstream religions).
173. See Cutter, 125 S.Ct. at 2123 (explaining that RLUIPA gives no specific
religious group rights or benefits that other religious groups lack).
174. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2005) (explaining that RLUIPA only applies to
challenges to governmental actions that burden inmates’ religious exercise).
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CONCLUSION
In his outspoken concurrence striking down RFRA in City of
Boerne, Justice Stevens suggested that RFRA violated the
Establishment Clause, stating that RFRA “provided the Church with a
legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain”175 Therefore, it
follows that many anticipated that Justice Stevens would be the lone
dissenter in Cutter.176 However, this was not the case, most likely
because, in Cutter, the Court failed to fully assess the impact RLUIPA
has had on those prisoners who are not atheist or agnostic.177
Like its predecessor, RLUIPA is much more than an
accommodation of religion; it gives religious groups and inmates a
powerful tool that they can use to gain benefits not available to
others.178 Under RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard, prisoners who
invent religious reasons for their demands receive different
treatment.179 RLUIPA’s minimal requirements for proving a religious
belief will lead to excessive litigation under RLUIPA and more and
more prisoners will claim to be members of non-orthodox religions in
order to benefit from the protections of religions.180 Further,
because RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard places the burden of proof
on prison officials, government administrators ultimately will spend
their time defending necessary prison procedures, instead of
anticipating security concerns.181
The Cutter Court may have been aware of the many problems
implicated by the statute’s strict scrutiny standard and thus, attempted
to restrain the application of RLUIPA in their May 31, 2005
opinion.182 However, by requiring lower courts to adjudicate
175. See 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (opining that the
exemption at issue in City of Boerne was government preference for religion over no
religion).
176. See PEW FORUM, THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 71, at 3 (surmising that it is
possible the reason Justice Stevens did not dissent in Cutter was that he believed
RLUIPA claims would fail even if the law were upheld).
177. See id. at 2 (noting that in analyzing the constitutionality of RLUIPA pursuant
to the Establishment Clause the Court focused on congressional evidence that
minority religions are often discriminated against in prisons and that RLUIPA helps
relieve this problem).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (establishing that RLUIPA is only available to people
and institutions asserting religious rights).
179. See supra Part II.C (discussing that because under RLUIPA religious prisoners
receive greater protection, non-religious prisoners have incentive to convert).
180. See supra Part II.B (noting that Congress designed RLUIPA’s requirements to
allow as many claims as possible).
181. See Walston, supra note 4, at 480 (arguing that as a result of the excessive
claims prisoners file under RLUIPA “no good act by prison officials will go
unpunished”).
182. See supra Part II.A (explaining that the Cutter Court appeared to create a
new standard of scrutiny for RLUIPA claims that is strict and deferential).
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RLUIPA claims pursuant to strict scrutiny standards, yet
“appropriately deferential” to prison officials, the Court created a
standard that is confusing and may lead to inconsistent outcomes.183

183. See, e.g., Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2005)
(determining that, based on the outcome of the Cutter decision, the district court
failed to give proper deference to the prison system and therefore remanded the
case); Gooden v. Crain, 389 F. Supp 2d 722, 728 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (rejecting a Texas
prison’s motion to dismiss a Muslim inmate’s challenge to prison grooming
regulation under RLUIPA because the Cutter court had determined that RLUIPA is a
valid accommodation of religion).
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